


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2 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

**SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Mr. Frank A. Bartimo,
Asst. General Counsel (Manpower), Department of
Defense, 2 July 1964**

1. I called Mr. Frank Bartimo, Assistant General Counsel (Manpower), Department of Defense, today in an effort to determine DOD action in response to Mr. McGeorge Bundy's memorandum of 17 June 1964 concerning the 21 CI recommendations of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
2. Mr. Bartimo indicated that they had received the Bundy memorandum but had not as yet formulated in even a tentative way the DOD response with reference to Recommendation No. 7. He went on to say that the "polygraph package" that he had developed with the assistance of Mr. Bannerman had been held by Secretary Vance for several weeks and that this had been more or less superseded by an effort currently under way under the direction of Mr. Walter T. Skallerup, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary (Security Policy), Department of Defense, to come up with a new position on the use of the polygraph by Defense elements in light of the changed climate arising from the Moss Sub-Committee Hearings.
3. He indicated that Mr. Skallerup's paper reflected changes in Defense's program based on criticism arising during the appearance before the Moss Sub-Committee of the Service elements. He stated that many people in Defense were somewhat unhappy with the Skallerup paper and that it had caused a great deal of discussion and speculation.
4. In concluding our conversation he promised that he would ensure that a draft copy of Defense's response to Mr. Bundy's memorandum on Recommendation 7 would be coordinated with this Office in advance so that we might make any suggestions we considered appropriate. He anticipates that this draft paper will not be available until some time later in July.

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5. I informed Mr. Bartimo that we had given Mr. [REDACTED] and other representatives of NSA a two-hour briefing on our appearance before the Moss Sub-Committee and he indicated that he had been informed of this and was most appreciative of our action. He agreed with me that NSA representatives scheduled to appear before the Moss Sub-Committee should carefully avoid exposure to the transcripts of our hearings to prevent any possibility of charges by the Sub-Committee of collusion between CIA and NSA in this matter.

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SIGNED

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - EO/OS

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D/S:HJO/skh (2 July 64)